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At the Lisbon summit of 2000 the European Union (EU) set an agenda for making Europe the 
most competitive economy in the world.  The targets that were set then are unlikely to be 
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The Lisbon agenda 
The Lisbon agenda of 2000 was an ambitious agenda for making the European 
economy the most competitive economy in the world. It was accepted with unanimity by 
European leaders and has been applauded as a major breakthrough in European 
integration. But was it realistic, and could anyone be expected to disagree with it? The 
objectives that it put forward are objectives that every country in the world should have, as 
a matter of routine. It was essentially an agenda for increasing the wealth of European 
nations, one with which no politician could disagree. The key questions that will concern 
students of European integration in the years to come is why did our leaders decide to put 
their reputations on line and proclaim such an ambitious agenda for Europe? Why were 
such specific detailed targets set, a practice not common with politicians that come under 
regular public scrutiny by an inquisitive press? And why was it done at European level 
and not at the national level, according to each country’s preferences and needs? 
The experience of the five years that followed Lisbon proved that the agenda was 
over-ambitious. It may also have given a hint why politicians were prepared to risk their 
reputation on such specific targets: precisely because it was done at European level. As far 
as I know, no national politician has been voted down or re-elected on the basis of his or 
her record vis-à-vis Lisbon. Normally, if Europe is an issue in national elections, it is in 
connection to the relations between the country in question and the European Union; not 
in relation to how well the country is doing within an agreed European agenda.  
In the words of Wim Kok, who in 2004 headed a High-Level Group on the Lisbon 
Strategy, the strategy was a kind of “Christmas tree”, consisting of over one hundred 
targets, sub-targets and indicators (in a speech to the Munich Economic Summit, May 
2005). The conclusions of the Group were that the Strategy was indeed over-ambitious, 
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setting as its primary target the overtaking of the United States as the leading knowledge-
based economy in the world. In the five years since Lisbon Europe continued to lag 
behind the United States, with the gap widening, and dynamic Asian economies have been 
getting closer to it. The Group emphasized the more sober objective of an economically 
strong Europe that was also socially responsible and environmentally sustainable. The key 
objectives were more growth and employment, because a Europe with more wealth is also 
more capable of supporting better social programmes and a better environment. 
My focus in this presentation will therefore be growth and employment. The 
targets of the Lisbon Strategy are well known: by the year 2010 the European Union 
should have employment rates for the working-age population (15-64 years) as close as 
possible to 70 per cent, for women at least 60 per cent and for the age group 55-64 years 
50 per cent. As the main driver for growth the Strategy set a target for R&D spending of at 
least 3 per cent of GDP, with two thirds or more done by the private sector. Although the 
targets were set at European level, the policies needed to achieve them have to be set at the 
national level. The evaluation process is also done at national level, and league tables of 
member states’ performance vis-à-vis the targets are regularly published. 
The Lisbon Strategy’s targets for growth and employment are not likely to be 
achieved. Progress has been slow, and a comparison between European countries post-
Lisbon and other OECD countries does not give one the impression that there is 
something different about the European countries (see figure 1). As shown in the figure, 
although some countries improved their employment performance, in the first five years 
since Lisbon no country that was below the 70% line in 1999 progressed sufficiently far 
towards the line by 2004. In fact, when it comes to specific measures designed to achieve 
the growth and employment targets, the Lisbon agenda does not appear to have had an 
impact on national policies. There has been a lot of talk and a lot of support for the 
objectives, but not much direct action, at least not more than would have been taken by a 
responsible government faced with the challenge of economic survival and growth in a 
rapidly globalizing world. 
Because of the failure to address the issues raised by the Lisbon agenda, there are 
frequent calls for reinvention of the process. New policies and a new focus are constantly 
sought. But the problem with the Lisbon process is not lack of knowledge of what policies 
can work. The problem is related to implementation. The European Employment Strategy 
of 1997 already had several specific measures designed to increase job creation. The 
OECD has repeatedly emphasized increased flexibility, adaptability, active labour market 
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measures towards the unemployed and lower taxes, for at least those at the lower end of 
the wage distribution. Similar recommendations were included in the report of the 
European Employment Taskforce, which reported in 2003. There is abundant knowledge 
of what is needed, if anything too much is written about what is needed and too little on 
how to put policies into practice. The reason might be that the types of policies needed are 
universal, they apply to all countries. But the processes needed to implement them are not 
common; they need to be decided at the national level, within the context of the 
institutions and objectives of the national government, which is much more difficult. And 
there are likely to be objections from many stakeholders who have vested interests in the 
status quo. 
I do not have the knowledge and it is not my objective to look at each member’s 
labour market performance and recommend specific measures for reform in individual 
countries. I will instead review policies that can be in principle effective in achieving the 
overall employment objectives. The adaptation to individual country needs will have to be 
done at the national level. A novel feature of my approach is that it puts policy in the 
context of the dynamic evolution of the economy, in a world of fast technological progress 
and increasing international competition. I consider it important to understand the 
underlying causes of low employment in Europe within the context of economic 
development and growth, before a policy prescription can be made. 
The connection between growth and jobs 
I will argue that although the emphasis in the Lisbon agenda is on the knowledge 
economy and on high-tech jobs, much of the job expansion that is needed to satisfy the 
Lisbon employment objectives will be in labour-intensive sectors of the economy, which 
experience low productivity growth. So job creation is not likely to be the main 
contributor to growth. The link runs the other way: more growth will bring job creation. 
There is evidence that increasing the growth rate of labour productivity, either through 
capital accumulation or through total factor productivity growth, increases the demand for 
labour, reduces unemployment and increases participation. In research that we did at LSE 
we found that increasing the growth rate of TFP by 1 percentage point reduces 
unemployment by about 1.3 percentage points (Pissarides and Vallanti, 2004). Such 
changes in the growth rate of TFP in Europe are feasible, given the low starting points. 
High growth is not spread uniformly across the economy. Inevitably some sectors 
will grow faster than others. The knowledge economy that is emphasized in the Lisbon 
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agenda is the high-tech sector that is the driver for growth. But it is not the main job 
creation sector. High growth usually does not create many jobs in the sectors that 
experience it. It creates wealth and this wealth creates demand for services elsewhere. The 
jobs growth that comes with productivity growth is more widespread through the economy 
than the productivity growth itself, and usually more heavily concentrated in low 
productivity sectors, such as retail trade, community services, medical care and the like. 
Of course, the people who take these jobs still need to be compensated sufficiently to give 
them the incentives to enter employment. High compensation in the low-growth sectors is 
achieved through high prices for their final products, not through more productive use of 
resources. This is why we experience more price inflation and more job creation in low-
productivity service sectors, a process sometimes known as Baumol’s cost disease 
(Baumol, 1967; Baumol et al, 1985).  
The European jobs deficit 
How can we tell that most jobs will be created in the low-productivity sectors? 
First, in the recent history of Europe employment has been moving out of agriculture and 
into the low-productivity service sectors, with manufacturing showing either a small fall 
or no change. In countries which completed earlier the transition out of agriculture, such 
as Britain and the United States, the subsequent transition was mainly out of 
manufacturing and again into services. Importantly, however, although average hours of 
work decline with economic development, there is also pressure in these countries for an 
increase in the participation rates of women of working age, especially those aged 15 to 50 
years. So historically, European countries should expect that given their small agricultural 
sectors, there will be pressures on their manufacturing sectors to contract as well, and 
pressures for an increase in women’s employment rates. The pressures on manufacturing 
to contract are likely to intensify with the emergence of large Asian manufacturing 
producers. Trade and export-led growth can provide a cushion for manufacturing, as it 
happened with Japan and Germany in the last thirty years, but it is not likely to continue in 
the future. Europe has to face the reality of the dynamics of the 21st century: most 
employment growth is likely to come to service sectors that do not rely on high-tech 
knowledge or trade. But in some ways this is good news for the employment objectives of 
Lisbon. The economic forces in Europe should be creating demands for job creation in 
sectors of the economy that can easily be met with the existing human capital stock of 
each country. 
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Creating demands, however, is not equivalent to creating jobs. The United States is 
the most advanced country in the dynamic economic process that I described. Its 
manufacturing sector is shrinking and service employment rising. Female participation is 
also rising. As a result, the main gaps in employment now between European countries 
and the United States are in service employment. Production industries and agriculture 
occupy more or less the same fraction of people in most economies, with some small 
differences. Can Europe expect a similar dynamic evolution as the one experienced by the 
United States, and so can it sit back and wait for the natural economic forces to satisfy the 
Lisbon objectives? 
This is a difficult question to answer, but given the different performance of 
countries within Europe, despite their similar level of economic development, the answer 
is probably no, at least in the foreseeable future. Big gaps remain in employment between 
Europe and the United States, and within Europe, mainly between the north and the south. 
These gaps are mainly in business services and community services. Figure 2 shows the 
gaps in the two types of services. The main gaps are in business services, with only Britain 
surpassing the United States because of its large financial sector in the City of London. 
But there are also substantial gaps in community services, with the exception of the 
Scandinavian countries (Sweden and Denmark), which have many community services 
supported mostly by the state. 
Figure 3 decomposes the employment gaps in the business sector. Here we find the 
biggest gaps in retail and wholesale trade. There are also gaps in financial services, mainly 
in business services connected with real estate and in the provision of a variety of other 
services to employers. The biggest gaps in financial services are in the southern European 
countries. The third sub-sector in the business group includes transport and 
communication but gaps here are small. 
Perhaps the most interesting figure in this group is figure 4, which looks at 
employment growth in the business services sector. Over the last thirty years European 
countries have been achieving good rates of growth in finance, real estate and insurance 
services, which include high-tech computing services. But they have not been able to 
match the US rate of growth in the retail and wholesale trade sector, which is the one 
characterized by lower productivity growth in this group. 
It is apparent from this analysis that the jobs deficit in Europe is in sectors which 
are labour-intensive with low productivity growth. Europe has been creating jobs in the 
“knowledge” sectors at a comparable scale to the United States, although it has not 
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substantially closed the gap yet. But the low-growth sectors in the United States attract big 
numbers of workers, especially women, which is not matched in Europe. Compensation in 
these jobs is good in the United States because the prices of their final products are 
relatively high. The fact that consumers can afford to pay the high prices is itself the result 
of more employment. When women leave the home to take employment they create 
demand for market services such as cleaning, food preparation and child care, which 
creates more jobs for other women. 
Why are European economies not creating so many jobs? 
The same pressures for an increase in the consumption of business and communal 
services are present in Europe. Europe has more or less caught up with the United States 
in productivity per hour, although, because Americans work more hours, income per head 
is higher. But do Americans really work more hours than Europeans? Americans work 
more hours in the market, and so create more jobs, but they work fewer hours at home. In 
recent research on the hours worked by Americans and Europeans, Freeman and Schettkat 
(2005) concluded that they work approximately the same number of hours, but Europeans 
work much more in the home than Americans do – see table 1. The difference between 
market and home allocation is particularly marked for women. European women work on 
average 8 hours less than do American women in the market, but they work 10 hours more 
in the home. They do more house maintenance, they cook more at home and they look 
after relatives. They are engaged in “home production”, something Americans do much 
less. The Lisbon agenda wants Europeans to move to the market, to “marketize” their 
home production. I leave to one side the question whether this is a good policy to 
encourage, and address the question how can it be done? 
The natural conclusion is that in order to increase employment in Europe we need 
to make the market more accessible to women, who now shy away from market work, and 
we need to create good jobs in labour intensive sectors of the economy. It is interesting, 
and encouraging for Europe, that the sectors that lag behind the United States in job 
creation are female-friendly sectors: retailing, restaurants and hotels, and community 
services, such as childcare and nursing care. Men need not be displaced from their current 
jobs in order to make room for women in the labour market. 
An explanation why the market pressures that have given rise to more employment 
in the United States have not had the same impact in Europe runs as follows. Consumers 
work out the relative cost of buying some services in the market versus providing them at 
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home. When the price of market goods relative to per capita incomes is lower more 
households will choose to use the market for services that have close substitutes in the 
home. So in order to understand why Europeans use the market less than do Americans we 
need to look at the factors that influence the relative costs of buying in the market versus 
producing at home. 
There cannot be large differences in the cost of producing services at home in 
Europe and America. Consumer durables are widely available and homes are as well 
equipped in Europe as they are in America. The factors that can explain the differences in 
employment patterns in Europe and America must be in the returns to market work and in 
the cost of buying services from the market. The interpretation of these costs must be 
general, to include convenience factors and not only prices and wages, although prices and 
wages are important too. Several factors can be contributing to making the products of 
market work in Europe too expensive for consumers, and market work itself unattractive 
for workers. The two factors are, of course, interconnected. If there are features that make 
market work unattractive they could be offset by higher prices for the final product; but 
higher prices would then choke off demand and so reduce employment. 
What can make market work more attractive? 
The key question for Lisbon then is what can make market work more attractive? 
And especially more attractive to women?  
First, there are various restrictions on market work, which, although individually 
may not appear very important, when aggregated they add up to a lot. I include here, 
flexibility in market work hours, flexibility in shop opening times, and the availability of 
inexpensive child care services (see Freeman and Schettkat, 2005). These types of 
facilities make it easier for women with children, and for those without children who have 
a household to run, to enter employment. Examples of European countries that have 
liberalized restrictions such as the ones I listed here, and succeeded in increasing female 
employment to the Lisbon target levels, include the Netherlands and United Kingdom. 
Both countries have very large numbers of part-time jobs, and, in Britain at least, evenings 
and weekends are the busiest times in the shops. The Scandinavian countries have also 
succeeded in increasing female employment. A factor here is the widely available child 
care, but also the fact that many of the communal services marketized in the United States 
are provided by the state, which employs large numbers of women. 
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Another important factor in the employment of women is education. Employment 
differentials across countries become less at higher educational attainments. Women with 
university degrees have similar rates of employment everywhere. Of course, it would take 
long for substantially more women to acquire university degrees and gain employment. 
But the impact of higher education on women’s employment is not one-for-one. When 
more women acquire education and gain employment they create demand for the services 
of other women with less education. There is a multiplier effect of education which brings 
to the market a larger number of women than the ones leaving college with higher 
qualifications. 
The initiative to increase education in Europe comes from the state. But for it to be 
effective two pre-conditions need to be satisfied. First, women need to know that jobs will 
be available and that they would be compensated as well as men’s jobs are. There is 
legislation in the European Union against discrimination but it is not always effectively 
implemented (Boeri et al., 2005). Increasing the effectiveness of legislation and making 
working conditions good for women will certainly improve the chances of the European 
Union to satisfy the Lisbon objectives. In the United States anti-discrimination legislation 
has been in existence and given a high profile since the early 1970s, before any European 
country did it, and it contributed to the expansion of female employment. 
Second, highly qualified women need to know that there will be less qualified 
people around, mainly women, prepared to do for compensation the tasks normally done 
in the home. This is where childcare services becomes important, but equally important, 
because they affect larger numbers of women, are the availability of workers who would 
be prepared to work as cleaners, in restaurants and in laundries. In order to achieve this the 
European Union needs to think seriously about unskilled migration and its potential 
contribution to the Lisbon agenda. To bring an example from a smaller country with 
which I am familiar, in Cyprus employment levels are within the Lisbon targets. 
Educational levels and female employment rates are unusually high for a Mediterranean 
country. These rates are supported by large numbers of unskilled immigrants on regulated 
fixed-term contracts, working in business and community services, mostly domestic 
service, nursing and retailing. Similar patterns are apparently observed elsewhere: the 
Pilipino domestic worker has freed many European women from home production and 
helped her make the transition to the market (see Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003, cited 
by Duflo, 2005) 
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Making it easier for employers 
Job creation needs to be attractive to potential employers too. An obvious policy 
reform here is that labour markets should be liberalized, especially at the lower end of the 
skills distribution. This is not new: it has been emphasized in numerous writings by the 
OECD and the European Commission. But reforms have not been forthcoming at the 
required speed. The administrative burden on companies, especially on new companies 
and on small ones, certainly explains some of the gaps in service jobs. Jobs in business 
and community services are frequently performed within small companies, or by 
individuals working on their own account. It is important if these individuals are to be 
attracted to the market that setting up a small company and running it should be easy and 
inexpensive. For example, there should be one window for completing all the necessary 
administrative work for a new company, setting it up should be fast and completed within 
a week, and the company should not be required to report detailed accounts and register 
for VAT if turnover is expected to be below a certain limit, which should be generous. 
Direct assistance from the state for new entrepreneurs is also important. 
There is good correlation across countries between the severity of barriers to entry 
and employment. Not surprisingly the correlation is better with business services, which 
as we saw are dominated by shops and small offices, than with community services, which 
are mainly related to health and education (see figures 5 and 6). In a more micro study of 
the French retail sector Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) also found that barriers to the setting 
up of supermarkets have a negative impact on the local labour market. And other studies 
done by industrial economists have discovered that unimpeded entrepreneurship helps 
both in the diffusion of new technologies and in the adaptation of businesses to new 
challenges. Diffusion and adaptability are important for Europe in a world that combines 
the two challenges of technological catch-up with the United States and globalization. In 
fact, in the presence of these two challenges adaptability is more important than R&D 
geared to new discoveries. 
Another obvious factor in the attractiveness of job creation, that has attracted a lot 
of attention recently, is taxation, which can discourage both employers and employees. 
The reason for the recent interest is Prescott’s (2002) claim that the entire gap between 
European and American hours of work can be explained by it. Taxation makes home work 
relatively more attractive because it is not taxed. But econometric evidence has failed to 
find a large impact of taxation on employment. There seems to be a divergence between 
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the findings of studies based on computations with simple equilibrium models, such as 
those of Prescott and Rogerson (2005), and the findings of econometric studies. A 
criticism that can be made of the computational findings is that they do not distinguish 
between different types of taxation and the uses to which the tax revenue is put into, which 
must influence the impact that taxation has on employment. They model taxes as a 
proportional tax on income from work which is subsequently returned to the worker as a 
lump sum transfer. This type of tax has the biggest impact on the supply of labour, but it is 
not necessarily the typical European tax. 
Nevertheless, taxation has a bigger impact on economic activity at the lower end of 
the productivity distribution. Profit margins and net gains from employment are smaller 
when productivity is lower so a given tax takes a bigger proportional slice of net gain. 
Low-wage labour and jobs should not be taxed. It is now widely accepted that capital 
should not be taxed much because it is mobile. If one country taxes it, capital will flee to 
another. The experience with home and market work in Europe shows that low-wage 
labour is also mobile, between the home and the market. Based on the same principle, 
low-wage market work should not be taxed much either. Otherwise it will flee to the 
home. 
What can the Commission do? 
As I emphasized, the most important reforms that are needed to achieve the Lisbon 
targets are at the national level. Not all countries of the Union need the same reforms and 
it is up to individual governments to look into their own situation and decide what is more 
urgent. But the Commission can also help. The final question that I want to address is, Is 
there anything that the European Commission can do other than give advice and exert 
moral pressure? 
The answer is that there is – and although a lot has been done a lot remains to do. 
The Kok report highlighted five areas of policy that require urgent action. Four of them 
are firmly in the national domain: encouraging R&D, improving the business climate, 
improving the performance of the labour market and ensuring environmental 
sustainability. But the fifth, the completion of the single market, requires largely action 
from European institutions. The most important steps towards the single internal market 
were taken in connection with the 1992 process. Integration is important because 
European companies can take advantage of economies of scale. Prices of goods are 
generally lower in America than in Europe and the reason is that American companies 
 11
have better distribution networks and make better use of diversified locations within the 
United States. Europe can do the same, but it is not doing it yet. The main benefits from 
European integration so far have been the benefits from free trade. The Commission 
estimates that in the first ten years of the single market European GDP gained about 1.5 
per cent. This is not very much when compared with the annual rate of growth of GDP, in 
fact it corresponds to about a year’s growth. There have also been some gains in job 
creation but with respect to services, the biggest component of GDP, integration has not 
yet taken place. The Kok Group rightly emphasizes that efforts towards completing the 
single market should be stepped up, especially in the liberalization of services. Even 
financial services are not fully integrated, although there is an agreement that they should 
be. On paper integration is complete in the goods sector, but the large differences in prices 
that remain across Europe is evidence that it has not yet fully taken place. However, the 
limits here may be due to corporate policies and not a matter of national policies. If that is 
the case the Commission can again take action to improve integration. 
Beyond this channel, which is important enough, the Commission has been 
emphasizing mainly the need for reform and the need for more effort to achieve the 
Lisbon objectives. But it has not taken concrete action. The failure to take the necessary 
action at he national level is partly the result of countries not doing what they said they 
would do, and partly not saying or doing what is needed. The Commission could work out 
a system or incentives to make countries more willing to take on the necessary measures. 
For example, it could give some financial compensation for research and other spending 
which is now financed by national budgets, but which contributes to the Lisbon objectives. 
Financial aid or incentives have not been tied closely to the Lisbon objectives. If the 
Commission wishes to accelerate the reform process this is one area through which it 
could contribute a lot. 
Final remarks 
I conclude by listing the main claims made in this paper 
 
1. The job creation required to achieve the Lisbon targets will be mainly in sectors 
with low productivity growth: retail trade, a variety of business services, and 
community services. 
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2. European countries have been successful at creating jobs in the “knowledge 
sectors”, such as financial services, but have been unsuccessful at creating them 
in the more labour-intensive service sectors. 
3. Most new employment will come from women now outside the labour force and 
it will “marketize” many of the services now done in the home, such as child 
and other personal care, cleaning, shopping etc. 
4. In order to achieve the new job creation employment needs to be made more 
female-friendly through more flexibility of working hours, more flexibility in 
shop opening hours and easier availability of domestic service. 
5. Education needs to be further advanced and supported by less expensive 
immigrant labour in the labour-intensive service sectors, including the home. 
6. Other labour market reforms include an increase in the flexibility of 
employment, less taxation of low-wage jobs and less administrative burdens on 
new entrepreneurs. 
7. Finally, it should be apparent from this discussion that the failures of Lisbon are 
not due to lack of knowledge of the principles behind the right policies, but to 
lack of urgency in the reform and implementation process needed to put those 
principles into practice. 
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Table 1 
Weekly hours of work, early 1990s, ages 25-54 
 
 men women 
 market home total market home total 
US 44.1 16.1 60.2 28.7 30.1 58.8 
EU 43.4 13.6 57.0 20.7 40.5 61.2 
 
Source: Freeman and Schettkat (2005) 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook
Source: OECD STAN Database (online)
Figure 2
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Figure1
Employment Rates in 1999 and 2004
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Figure 3
Business services, US-EU gap
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Figure 4
Average annual change in employment rate, 1970-2004
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Figure 5
Business services employment and entry barriers
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Figure 6
Community services employment and entry barriers
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